Bottom line: episodic manipulation of silver futures by bank traders is proven by fines, admissions and criminal convictions. A coordinated, decades-long cap on the silver price is not proven: regulators and courts that examined that claim did not find it.
The proven cases are about spoofing: traders placed large orders they never intended to fill, to push prices for seconds or minutes and get better fills on their real orders on the other side. The table below sorts every major case into what was proven, what was only alleged, and what was dismissed, with dates and a link to the official record for each. This is history, not a price call.
The record: proven, alleged, dismissed
Proven means a regulator's order, a settlement with admitted facts, a jury verdict or a criminal conviction. Most proven conduct ran from 2008 to 2016 and was resolved between 2018 and 2025. Alleged covers opinions, studies and settled lawsuits with no admission. Dismissed means the claim was investigated or litigated and nothing was left standing.
| Date | Case | What the record says | Official source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proven fines, admissions or convictions | |||
| Jan 2018 | Deutsche Bank, UBS, HSBC (CFTC) | Spoofing settlements in precious metals futures: Deutsche Bank $30M, UBS $15M, HSBC $1.6M. | CFTC release 7681-18 |
| Jun 2019 | Merrill Lynch (CFTC) | About $25M for spoofing in precious metals futures, 2008–2014. A trader chat quoted by the CFTC: "if you spoof this it really moves." | CFTC release 7946-19 |
| Aug 2020 | Scotiabank (CFTC) | $127.4M in total: $60.4M for gold and silver spoofing (2008–2016), $17M for false statements to CFTC staff, $50M for unrelated swap-dealer failures. | CFTC release 8220-20 |
| 2020-09-29 | JPMorgan (CFTC + DOJ) | Record $920.2M: $436.4M penalty, $311.7M restitution, $172.0M disgorgement, plus a DOJ deferred prosecution agreement. Spoofing in gold, silver, platinum, palladium and Treasury futures, 2008–2016. | CFTC release 8260-20 · DOJ release |
| Aug 2022 / Aug 2023 | Two former JPMorgan metals traders | Convicted Aug 2022 of fraud, attempted manipulation and spoofing; acquitted of racketeering and conspiracy. Sentenced Aug 2023: 2 years plus $50K, and 1 year and 1 day plus $35K. DOJ said losses to other traders exceeded $10M. | DOJ release |
| 2025-08-20 | Appeal (7th Circuit) | The US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld both convictions. | 7th Cir. opinion 23-2849 |
| 1988 | Hunt brothers (the opposite case) | A long squeeze up, not a cap. In 1979–80 silver went from about $9 to over $50, then collapsed to about $10. A jury found the Hunts liable and awarded Minpeco more than $132M; six brokers settled for $64.6M. | Minpeco v. Hunt, 718 F. Supp. 168 |
| Alleged claims, opinions and studies, not legal findings | |||
| Oct 2010 | CFTC Commissioner statement | Commissioner Bart Chilton said he believed there had been "repeated attempts to influence prices" in silver. A personal view; the CFTC brought no case from its silver probe. | CFTC statement, 2010-10-26 |
| 2014 | Academic study of the London silver fix | Caminschi (2014) found prices measurably lower during the fix and trading spikes before the result was published. Evidence of unusual patterns, not a court finding. | Working paper (NYU Stern, PDF) |
| 2016 | London silver fix lawsuit: Deutsche Bank | Deutsche Bank settled class claims for $38M without admitting wrongdoing. | SDNY docket 14-md-2573 |
| Dismissed investigated or sued, no case left standing | |||
| 2013-09-25 | CFTC silver investigation | Opened Sept 2008; closed after more than 7,000 staff hours. The CFTC found "not a viable basis" to bring charges. | CFTC release 6709-13 |
| 2023-05-22 | London silver fix lawsuit: HSBC, Scotiabank | The remaining claims were dismissed with prejudice, so they cannot be refiled. | SDNY order, 14-md-2573 |
Amounts are as stated in each official release. "Proven" refers to the specific conduct in each order or verdict, not to any wider theory.
JPMorgan: the biggest case
On September 29, 2020, JPMorgan agreed to pay $920.2M, the largest spoofing penalty the CFTC had ever imposed. The CFTC order covered a $436.4M civil penalty, $311.7M in restitution and $172.0M in disgorgement, and the bank entered a deferred prosecution agreement with the Justice Department. The conduct spanned 2008 to 2016 and covered gold, silver, platinum and palladium futures as well as US Treasury futures.
Two of its former precious metals traders went to trial. In August 2022 a jury convicted them of fraud, attempted manipulation and spoofing, and acquitted them of racketeering and conspiracy. In August 2023 they were sentenced to 2 years in prison and a $50K fine, and to 1 year and 1 day and a $35K fine. The DOJ said losses to other market participants exceeded $10M. On August 20, 2025, the Seventh Circuit upheld the convictions.
The case for a long-term cap, and the counterpoints
People who argue that banks have held silver down for decades point to two things. First, concentration: the CFTC's Bank Participation Report for October 6, 2026 showed 20 banks holding 48.1% of COMEX silver short positions but only 14.2% of longs, out of 105,130 contracts of open interest. Second, the paper market is much bigger than the metal in COMEX vaults (see paper to metal and the silver squeeze tracker). Supporters also cite Commissioner Chilton's 2010 statement and the 2014 study of the London fix.
The counterpoints from the record:
- Hedging. Bank futures positions often hedge over-the-counter business with clients, such as miners and refiners locking in prices. The CFTC says it "cannot know with certainty" what share of bank positions is hedging.
- Short-lived effects. In Gamma Traders (2nd Cir. 2022), the court described spoofing's price effects as lasting seconds to minutes, not months or years.
- Both directions. In the proven cases, traders spoofed to push prices both up and down, depending on the orders they wanted filled.
- Investigations came up empty. The CFTC's five-year silver probe ended in 2013 with no charges, and the London fix claims against HSBC and Scotiabank were dismissed with prejudice in 2023.
The opposite case: the Hunt brothers
The most famous silver manipulation pushed prices up. In 1979 and 1980 the Hunt brothers built huge positions in silver futures and physical metal. Silver went from about $9 an ounce to over $50, then collapsed to about $10 when exchanges tightened the rules and the Hunts could not meet margin calls. In 1988 a jury found them liable and awarded the Peruvian state metals marketer Minpeco more than $132M; six brokerage firms settled for $64.6M.
How to read this page
Every row is tied to a dated public record, and we link to the regulator, the Justice Department or the court rather than to commentary. We don't say what silver will do next, and nothing here is investment advice. For today's dated market numbers, see COMEX silver inventory and silver premiums.
Sources
- CFTC: JPMorgan $920M order (8260-20)
- DOJ: JPMorgan deferred prosecution agreement
- DOJ: former JPMorgan traders sentenced
- 7th Circuit opinion, No. 23-2849 (2025-08-20)
- CFTC: Scotiabank (8220-20)
- CFTC: Deutsche Bank, UBS, HSBC (7681-18)
- CFTC: Merrill Lynch (7946-19)
- SDNY: London silver fix litigation, 14-md-2573
- CFTC: silver investigation closed (6709-13)
- CFTC: Commissioner Chilton statement (2010-10-26)
- CFTC Bank Participation Report, Oct 2026
- Caminschi (2014), Any Silver Linings? working paper
- Minpeco v. Hunt, 718 F. Supp. 168
FAQ
Have banks been proven to manipulate silver?
Yes, in episodes. Between 2018 and 2020 the CFTC and DOJ fined JPMorgan, Scotiabank, Merrill Lynch, Deutsche Bank, UBS and HSBC for spoofing precious metals futures, mostly between 2008 and 2016, and two former JPMorgan traders were convicted in 2022.
Has a decades-long cap on the silver price been proven?
No. No regulator or court has found a coordinated, long-running cap. The CFTC closed a five-year silver investigation in 2013 without charges, and the remaining London silver fix claims were dismissed in 2023.
What is spoofing?
Placing large orders you intend to cancel before they fill, to create a false picture of supply or demand and get better prices on your real orders. Courts have described its price effects as lasting seconds to minutes.
How much did JPMorgan pay for spoofing metals?
$920.2M under its September 29, 2020 resolution with the CFTC and DOJ: a $436.4M penalty, $311.7M restitution and $172.0M disgorgement.
What happened to the London silver fix lawsuit?
Deutsche Bank settled for $38M in 2016 without admitting wrongdoing. On May 22, 2023 the remaining claims against HSBC and Scotiabank were dismissed with prejudice.
Who were the Hunt brothers?
Texas investors who tried to corner silver in 1979 and 1980. Silver rose from about $9 to over $50 and then fell to about $10. A 1988 jury found them liable to Minpeco for more than $132M.